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Verschure states his Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) provides a solution to the symbol grounding problem.

The state spaces in the formal definition of Verschure's DAC already seems to comprise symbols.

The model proposed by Heinrich et al. builds upon the one by Hinoshita et al. It adds visual input and thus shows how learning of language may not only be grounded in perception of verbal utterances, but also in visual perception.

The fact that the brain regions activated by (hearing, reading...) certain words correspond to the categories the words belong to (action words for motor areas etc.) suggests semantic grounding in perception and action.

Words from some categories do not activate brain regions which are related to their meaning. The semantics of those words do not seem to be grounded in perception or action. Pulvermüller calls such categories and their neural representations disembodied.

Some abstract, disembodied words seem to activate areas in the brain related to emotional processing. These words may be grounded in emotion.

It seems that the representations of words can be more or less modal ie. words may be more or less abstract and thus more or less grounded in sensory, motor, or emotional areas.

Embodied grounding can come not only from sensory but also from perception of internal states.

De Kamps and van der Velde argue for combinatorial productivity and systematicity as fundamental concepts for cognitive representations. They introduce a neural blackboard architecture which implements these principles for visual processing and in particular for object-based attention.