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Verschure argues that models of what he calls the mind, brain, body nexus should particularly account for data about the behavior at the system level, ie. overt behavior. He calls this convergent validation

In Verschure's concept of convergent validation, the researcher does not seek inspiration for but constraints for falsification or validation of models in nature.

Mommy, where do models come from?

Verschure champions his model of Distributed Adaptive Control as a model comprising all aspects of the mind, brain, body nexus.

Verschure states his Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) provides a solution to the symbol grounding problem.

The state spaces in the formal definition of Verschure's DAC already seems to comprise symbols.

Verschure states his is an early model in the tradition of what he calls the "predictive brain" hypothesis and relates it to Friston's free energy principle and Kalman filtering.

Distributed Adaptive Control is a system that can learn sensory-motor contingencies

Verschure explains that, in his DAC system, the contextual layer overrules the adaptive layer as soon as it is able to predict perception well enough.

One version of DAC uses SOMs.

If increased importance of accurate map alignment is what causes stronger map alignment in the optic tectum of owls that hunt than in those of owls that do not hunt (with visually displacing prisms), then that could point either

• to value-based learning in the OT
• or to a role of cognitive input to the OT (hunting owls pay more attention/are more interested in audio-visual stimuli than resting or feeding owls).

It is hard to explain higher-level cognition solely in terms of correspondence to perception or action.

The traditional view of cognitive representation needs to be extended rather than replaced by aspects and mechanisms of correspondence to perception and action.

Disembodied' theories account for intentionality relatively well: they posit cognitive representations which stand for real-world entities even in their absence (or inexistence).

Embodied cognition has a harder time explaining off-line cognition, ie. cognition about things that don't stimulate the senses.

Mental simulation, ie. simulation of sensorimotor interaction, is one way in which embodied cognitive theories can account for offline cognition.

Some things we think about (like moral judgements, dynamics in economy) are very abstract and it is hard to connect them to sensorimotor interactions.

Clark calls theories radical embodiment' if they make one or more of the following claims:

1. Classical tools of cognitive science are insufficient to understand cognition (and others, like dynamical systems are needed)
2. Representations and computation on them are inadequate to describe cognition
3. Modularizing the brain is misleading.

It is interesting that Rucci et al. modeled map alignment in barn owls using value-based learning so long before value based learning was demonstrated in map alignment in barn owls.

Stroop presented color words which were either presented in the color they meant (congruent) or in a different (incongruent) color. He asked participants to name the color in which the words were written and observed that participants were faster in naming the color when it was congruent than when it was incongruent with the meaning of the word.

The Stroop test has been used to argue that reading is an automatic task for proficient readers.

Greene and Fei-Fei show in a Stroop-like task that scene categorization is automatic and obligatory for simple (`entry-level') categories but not for more complex categories.

Cognitive factors can influence multisensory processing.

Semantical congruence can influence multisensory integration.

Semantic multisensory congruence can

• shorten reaction times,
• lower detection thresholds,
• facilitate visual perceptual learning.