Show Reference: "Grounded Cognition"

Grounded Cognition Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 59, No. 1. (15 August 2008), pp. 617-645, doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 by Lawrence W. Barsalou
@article{barsalou-2008,
    abstract = {Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, memory, knowledge, language, thought, social cognition, and development. Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect the growth and impact of grounded cognition.},
    address = {Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 barsalou@emory.edu.},
    author = {Barsalou, Lawrence W.},
    citeulike-article-id = {2137963},
    citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639},
    citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639},
    citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17705682},
    citeulike-linkout-3 = {http://www.hubmed.org/display.cgi?uids=17705682},
    day = {15},
    doi = {10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639},
    issn = {0066-4308},
    journal = {Annual Review of Psychology},
    keywords = {cognitive-neuroscience, embodiment, research},
    month = aug,
    number = {1},
    pages = {617--645},
    pmid = {17705682},
    posted-at = {2014-09-05 17:21:39},
    priority = {2},
    title = {Grounded Cognition},
    url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639},
    volume = {59},
    year = {2008}
}

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Mental simulation, ie. simulation of sensorimotor interaction, is one way in which embodied cognitive theories can account for offline cognition.

Barsalou writes that most researchers in cognitive psychology and cognitive science who accept that many neural representations are modal at the same time hold that there are amodal representations.

Embodied grounding can come not only from sensory but also from perception of internal states.

Biorobotics has been a driving force in embodiment theory.